Abstract. We revisit a long-lived folklore impossibility result for factoring-based encryption and properly establish that reaching maximally secure one-wayness (i.e. equivalent to factoring) and resisting chosenciphertext attacks (CCA) are incompatible goals for single-key cryptosystems. We pinpoint two tradeoffs between security notions in the standard model that have always remained unnoticed in the Random Oracle (RO) model. These imply that simple RO-model schemes such as Rabin/RW-SAEP[+]/OAEP [+][+], EPOC-2, etc. admit no instantiation in the standard model which CCA security is equivalent to factoring via a key-preserving reduction. We extend this impossibility to arbitrary reductions assuming non-malleable key generation, a property capturing the intuition that factoring a modulus n should not be any easier when given a factoring oracle for moduli n = n. The only known countermeasures against our impossibility results, besides malleable key generation, are the inclusion of an additional random string in the public key, or encryption twinning as in Naor-Yung or Dolev-Dwork-Naor constructions.
Introduction
The Paradox. When a proof is given that some cryptosystem is semantically secure under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) under some complexity assumption, one generally checks whether one-wayness can be guaranteed under a weaker assumption. In the case of simple cryptosystems based on factoring large integers however, an inevitable tradeoff seems to exist between one-wayness and chosen ciphertext security. This incompatibility, which was observed for factoring-based signature schemes as well [20, 22, 13] , is folklore knowledge and dates back to the late eighties. Despite early reasonings and attempts (later shown to be wrong) by a number of authors to formally prove it, this so-called "paradox" [13, Section 4] has remained essentially unexplored in a formal manner and, surprisingly enough, overlooked by contributors.
It is well known that the one-wayness of Rabin encryption and variants thereof [22, 4, 8, 5 ] is equivalent to factoring (FACT), meaning that any efficient algorithm inverting encryption provides an efficient way to factor the modulus. It turns out that the same algorithm can be used to totally break the cryptosystem (i.e. factor the modulus) under a trivial chosen ciphertext attack. This kind of attack has never been reported for RSA. But the one-wayness of RSA has not been shown to be equivalent to FACT. In fact, there is a separation result by Boneh and Venkatesan [6] which roughly tells that if a reduction from FACT to low-exponent RSA existed, then an efficient factoring algorithm could be constructed. Simultaneously, RSA-based cryptosystems such as OAEP [3] seem to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks convincingly well in practice. This provides the intuition that some sort of incompatibility must exist between achieving one-wayness under the weakest possible assumption (factoring) and achieving chosen ciphertext security at all.
In an early attempt to capture this intuition, Williams [22] makes the following (over)statement 3 : if the one-wayness of a factoring-based cryptosystem E is equivalent to factoring then E can be totally broken under chosen-ciphertext attack. A simple proof for this claim was later shown to be incorrect by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [13] , and the first public-key encryption scheme fully IND-CCA-secure under the factoring assumption was then discovered by Dolev, Dwork and Naor a few years later [10] . However, the incompatibility seems to persist for factoringbased encryption for which the public key consists of a single modulus.
Our Contributions. Our goal in this paper is to revisit [20, 22, 13] completely and clarify the conditions for such security incompatibilities to exist. We find that when properly formulated, certain security reductions for one-wayness and chosen-ciphertext security are indeed incompatible when considering single-key factoring-based encryption i.e. where the public key is just made of one hard-to-factor modulus. We reformulate the paradox observed by Williams in terms of key-preserving black-box reductions i.e. reductions which always call the adversarial oracle with the public-key they were given as input. We strengthen the original observation to show that if one can provide a key-preserving reduction from factoring to the (chosen-plaintext) semantic security of E, then E cannot fulfil plaintextchecking security. Plaintext-checking attacks, introduced in [18] , assume that the attacker is given oracle access to a distinguishing oracle that tells whether a given ciphertext encrypts a given plaintext. It follows from combining these results that a wide class of factoring-based cryptosystems admit no key-preserving black-box reduction from factoring to breaking the security notions IND-CCA, OW-CCA and IND-PCA in the standard model. This provides black-box separations with well-known security proofs standing in the RO model [2] such as the one of Rabin-SAEP [5] . We provide later an explanation as to why these incompatibilities are avoided in the case of Naor-Yung [17] and Dolev-Dwork-Naor [10] constructions where public keys are composed of two or more independent moduli, as well as in the RO model.
Finally, we define the notion of non-malleable key generators, which formally captures the property that the factorizations of two public moduli n, n where n = n are somehow "computationally independent" from one another. Similar notions of non-malleability for discrete logarithms recently appeared in [14, 16] . Using non-malleability, we extend the scope of the previous impossibility results to arbitrary black-box reductions. Our refined results state that simple and innocuous-looking RO-secure factoring-based encryption schemes (e.g. Rabin-SAEP), when combined with non-malleable key generation, black-box separate the RO model from the standard model in a very strong sense: IND-CCA security is equivalent to FACT in the RO model while no instantiation of these schemes preserves such equivalence in the standard model.
We note that all impossibility results stated in this paper are easily transposed (mutatis mutandis) to factoring-based signature schemes. We do not treat the case of signatures here due to lack of space.
Roadmap. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives preliminary facts about black-box reductions, single-key factoring-based encryption schemes and related security notions. Section 3 formally establishes the tradeoff between one-wayness and chosen ciphertext security. We also put forward a second tradeoff between semantic security against passive adversaries and plaintext-checking security. In Section 4, we give a formal definition of non-malleable instance generators and provide extended impossibility results. Section 5 discusses possible countermeasures such as encryption twinning to overcome these tradeoffs. We finally conclude on directions for further research in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Instance Generators. We define FACT as the problem of computing the list of all prime factors factors(n) = (p 1 , . . . , p t ) of a randomly chosen positive integer n. In cryptographic applications, one generally focuses on a specifically chosen distribution of hard instances by defining an instance generator Gen. Given a security parameter k, Gen(1 k ) generates a hard-to-factor modulus n, as well as the side information factors(n). A probabilistic algorithm A is said to (ε, τ )-break FACT [Gen] when
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and Gen and A halts after τ steps. FACT [Gen] is commonly referred to as the "factoring problem" when Gen is specified implicitly. For readability reasons, we may equivalently write (n, factors(n)) ← Gen(1 k ) or n ← Gen(1 k ) to state that n is drawn according to the distribution induced by Gen(1 k ). We note PK k the range of n i.e. the set of integers n such that Pr n ← Gen(1 k ) > 0 and
Here are some instance generators commonly used in factoring-based encryption:
Rabin-Williams. Given 1 k , select uniformly at random two k/2 -bit primes p and q such that p = 3 mod 8 and q = 7 mod 8. Set n = pq and output (n, (p, q)). OU. Given 1 k , randomly select two k/3 -bit primes p and q. Set n = p 2 q and output (n, (p, q)). RSA-e. Given a small integer e and 1 k , randomly select two k/2 -bit primes p and q such that gcd(p − 1, e) = gcd(q − 1, e) = 1. Set n = pq and output (n, (p, q)). Sophie-Germain. Given 1 k , randomly select two ( k/2 − 1)-bit primes p and q such that p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 are also primes. Set n = pq and output (n, (p, q)).
Single-Key Factoring-Based Encryption. A single-key factoring-based encryption scheme E with security parameter k can be described as the combination of an instance generator Gen with a family of trapdoor functions on Gen, namely a pair (Enc, Dec) such that for any n ∈ PK, Enc(n, ·, ·) and Dec(factors(n), ·) are integer-valued functions
where M n , R n and C n denote respectively the plaintext, random and ciphertext spaces 4 . We impose that for any n ∈ PK, m ∈ M n and r ∈ R n , Dec(factors(n), Enc(n, m, r)) = m. When Enc(n, M n , R n ) C n , some elements of C n are not proper ciphertexts. When c ∈ Enc(n, M n , R n ), Dec(factors(n), c) returns a failure symbol ⊥ ∈ M n . We impose that Enc(n, ·, ·) and Dec(n, ·, ·) be efficiently computable for any arguments i.e. can be evaluated in time at most poly (k) for n ∈ PK k . We identify E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) to the three following probabilistic procedures:
E.keygen : Run Gen(1 k ) to get (n, factors(n)). The secret key is factors(n) while the public key is n. E.encrypt : Given a public key n and a message m ∈ M n , select r ← R n uniformly at random and compute c = Enc(n, m, r). The output ciphertext is c ∈ C n . E.decrypt : Given the secret key factors(n) and a ciphertext c ∈ C n , output m = Dec(factors(n), c).
Examples of single-key factoring-based cryptosystems as defined above are countless: RSA 5 and its numerous variants OAEP [3] , REACT-RSA [18] , PKCS#1 v1. [9] also fall into this category. We refer the reader to the extensive literature on factoring and its applications to cryptography for more detail.
Black-Box Reductions. Black-box reductions constitute a natural tool to relate computational problems and capture the way most security proofs are constructed. Given two computational problems P 1 and P 2 , a blackbox reduction from P 1 to P 2 is a probabilistic algorithm R which solves P 1 with the help of an oracle solving instances of P 2 . R interacts with the oracle strictly as defined by the specification of P 2 and in particular has no view on the internal tapes of the oracle. The (extra) time of R is the number of elementary steps required by R to complete given that oracle calls count for one step by convention. A black-box reduction is polynomial when it runs in polynomial extra time (in a security parameter). It is crucial to remind that R can be polynomial even when no polynomial-time algorithm solving P 2 is known to exist. We denote by P 1 ⇐ P 2 the fact that P 1 is polynomially black-box reducible to P 2 . We write P 1 ⇐ R P 2 when R is known to reduce P 1 to P 2 . Polynomial equivalence is denoted by P 1 ≡ P 2 . Succ (P, τ ) stands for the maximal success probability of probabilistic algorithms solving P in no more than τ elementary steps. Similarly, Succ (P 1 ⇐ P 2 , τ, ε, ) stands for the maximal success probability of probabilistic algorithms solving P 1 in no more than τ elementary steps and at most calls to an oracle solving P 2 with probability ε. All the reductions considered in this paper are black-box.
Security Notions for Factoring-Based Encryption. Security notions for encryption schemes are obtained by combining an adversarial goal with an attack model. (Goals) We say that an encryption scheme is unbreakable (UBK) when one cannot extract the secret key matching a prescribed public key. The scheme is said to be one-way (OW) when no adversary can recover a plaintext given its encryption. Indistinguishability (IND, a.k.a. semantic security) relates to the hardness of deciding whether a given ciphertext encrypts a given plaintext. (Attacks) We consider three attack models in this paper. In a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), the adversary is given nothing more than the public key as input.
In a plaintext-checking attack (PCA), the adversary is given access to a plaintext-checking oracle that tells whether a given ciphertext encrypts a given plaintext [18] . In a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), the adversary has access to a decryption oracle. Oracle access in OW-CCA, IND-PCA and IND-CCA games is limited in the sense that the adversary is not allowed to call the oracle on the challenge ciphertext itself. These definitions are classical. We refer to [1, 18] for more detail on security notions for encryption schemes. For convenience, we denote security notions in a positive fashion e.g. OW-PCA [E] denotes the problem of breaking the one-wayness of E under plaintext-checking attack. This convention allows one to easily describe hierarchies between security notions using reductions. When the focus is on an adaptive attack (i.e. either PCA or CCA), we denote by -GOAL-ATK[E] the problem of breaking GOAL in no more than calls to the resource defined by ATK. Thus, breaking -IND-CCA [E] authorizes at most calls to the decryption oracle to break IND. We recall that
for any factoring-based encryption scheme E and adversarial goal GOAL ∈ {UBK, OW, IND}. We also have UBK-CPA [E] ≡ FACT [E.keygen]. We plot on Fig. 1 the map of security levels needed for the sake of this work.
Impossibility Results for Key-Preserving Reductions
In this section we focus on the standard-model security of single-key factoring-based encryption schemes. All black-box reductions known for such schemes are key-preserving, meaning informally that they make oracle calls to the adversary with the same key that they are given as input. We properly formalize this particular class of reductions in our setting 6 .
Key-Preserving Black-Box Reductions
Definition. We define key preservation for arbitrary security games related to a single-key factoring-based encryption scheme E. Assume that
are two computational problems (view P 1 and P 2 as security notions) associated to E. Consider a black-box reduction algorithm R such that
, meaning that R makes oracle calls to an algorithm A breaking
. Let Keys(n, aux, ) be the list (n 1 , . . . , n ) of public keys given by R as input to A where (n, aux) is the modulus and auxiliary input for which R has to break P 1 [E] and ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) denotes the random tape of R. Here the auxiliary input aux depends on the specification of P 1 . Note that the number of oracle calls is a deterministic function of n, aux and . R is said to be key-preserving when for any aux, and n ∈ PK k , either = 0 or n i = n for i ∈ [1, ].
Key-preservation is transitive. It is obvious that if
such that R 1 and R 2 are both key-preserving, then there is a key-preserving reduction R 3 such that
Reductions among security notions are key-preserving. We use later the property that all the straightforward black-box reductions between the classical security notions for E such as
and so forth [1] , are key-preserving. 6 A similar class of reductions for RSA encryption called simple reductions was recently considered by Brown [7] .
One-Wayness versus Chosen-Ciphertext Security
The following reformulates the observation made by Williams [22] .
Theorem 1. Let E be a single-key factoring-based encryption scheme. If there exists a polynomial key-preserving black-box reduction R such that
Proof. The main idea of the proof is basically a one-line statement and follows the reasoning of [22, 13] . Let R be such a key-preserving reduction algorithm, i.e. an algorithm that factors a modulus n randomly selected by E.keygen with non-negligible probability ε R and extra time τ given blackbox access to an adversary A breaking OW-CPA [E] with probability at least ε. We construct an adversary M against UBK-CCA [E]. Upon reception of the public key n in the UBK-CCA game, M runs R on input n and uses the decryption oracle to simulate the OW-CPA adversary. Since by definition the decryption oracle decrypts any ciphertext with probability 1 ≥ ε in one elementary step, the simulation of A is perfect for any ε ∈ (0, 1). The simulation complies to the definition of R because R is key-preserving. It is therefore crucial that this property holds otherwise M can by no means satisfy the queries R makes to A.
R eventually returns the factorization of n with probability ε R which M then returns as output value. UBK-CCA [E] can therefore be broken with probability at least ε R in extra time at most τ . We may assume w.l.o.g. that R never calls A(guess, c b ) before calling A(find, n) first and always calls A(guess, c b ) immediately after A(find, n), and that c b is always a proper encryption of m 0 or m 1 . Let 2 be the total number of calls to A. Overall R returns factors(n) with probability ε R and extra time τ .
We construct a trivial meta-reduction M which converts the key-preserving black-box reduction R into an adversary against UBK-PCA [E] and works with identical success probability in similar time. M works as follows. Given a public key n ← E.keygen, M runs R on input n and simulates the distinguisher A using the plaintext-checking oracle of the UBK-PCA game. When R calls A(find, n), M returns two randomly selected plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ← M n of equal length. When R calls A(guess, c b ), M sends (m 1 , c b ) to the plaintext-checking oracle and sends its output back to R (recall that given (m, c) ∈ M n × C n , the plaintext-checking oracle returns 1 if c encrypts m and 0 otherwise). Eventually R stops and M forwards the output of R. By definition, the plaintext-checking oracle distinguishes plaintext-ciphertext pairs with probability one and M therefore provides a perfect simulation of A to R for any ε ∈ (0, 1). Hence M outputs the factors of n with identical probability ε R in time τ + 2 ρ(k) where ρ(k) = poly (k) is the time needed to perform a random selection in M n . The Typical Example of Rabin-SAEP. We illustrate the importance of Corollary 1 by deducing a uninstantiability result for Rabin-SAEP. We first recall the definition of Rabin-SAEP [5] . Let s m , s 0 , s 1 be security parameters and k = s m + s 0 + s 1 . H denotes a fixed-size hash function H : {0, 1} s 1 → {0, 1} sm+s 0 . Here k plays the role of security parameter and the security proofs in [5] view s m , s 0 , s 1 as polynomial functions of k.
Separation
Rabin-SAEP.keygen : Given 1 k , generate a (k + 2)-bit RSA modulus n = pq, |p| = |q| = k/2 + 1, p = q = 3 mod 4 and n ∈ [2 k+1 , 2 k+1 + 2 k ). The secret key is factors(n) = (p, q) while the public key is n.
Rabin-SAEP.encrypt : Given a public key n, the message space is M n = {0, 1} sm and the random space is
Rabin-SAEP.decrypt : Given c ∈ C n and (p, q), compute z p = c (p+1)/4 mod p and z q = c (q+1)/4 mod q. Output ⊥ if z 2 p = c mod p or z 2 q = c mod q. Among the four values CRT(±z p , ±z q ), select the only one y such that y < n/2 and y can be parsed as ((m 0 s 0 ) ⊕ H(r)) r for some (m, r) ∈ M n × R n . If this fails or can be done for more than one value for y, output ⊥. Otherwise output m. We now state that for any instantiation of H, Rabin-SAEP does not admit a standard model counterpart of Theorem 3. This impossibility result comes as a direct application of Corollary 1. What Goes Wrong in the RO Model. Consider the meta-reduction M in the proof of Theorem 1. M cannot make any appropriate use of a keypreserving reduction R standing in the RO model. In a typical randomoracle-based reduction, the random oracles of E are simulated by R. This additional power is beneficial to R which introduces some form of correlation between its own variables and the responses of the simulated oracles. In a sense, R is not totally black-box i.e. does not only rely on the input-output behavior of the OW-CPA adversary because R controls the interactions between the adversary and the random oracles to increase its success probability.
It is easily seen that
In the chosen-ciphertext security game, however, the decryption oracle makes implicit calls (i.e. not controllable by any simulator) to the random oracles. Therefore, the meta-reduction cannot influence the decryption procedure by mimicking R and consequently, can by no means correlate the internal variables of the decryption oracle to its own variables the same way R does with the OW-CPA adversary. This explains why the RO model is unaware of incompatibilities in a general sense.
Extended Results for Non-Malleable Key Generation
What we are after in this section is a way to strengthen the previous impossibility results. Recall we had to restrict the scope of Theorems 1 and 2 to key-preserving security reductions because the meta-reduction M was unable to simulate the adversary A when R makes oracle calls to A with arbitrary moduli. Our approach is to explicitly assume, as a property of the key generation of E, that calling A with n = n is essentially of no help to R anyways. It appears that one faces definitional options when capturing this in a formal way: what we provide hereafter is the simplest definition that is strong enough for our purposes. This in turn allows us to consider arbitrary black-box reductions at the expense of making a complexity assumption on the key generation of E.
Defining Non-Malleable Generators
Intuition. An instance generator Gen is said to be malleable if factoring a randomly selected instance n ← Gen(1 k ) becomes substantially easier when given repeated access to an oracle which factors other instances n = n for n ∈ PK k . A typical example of malleability is when PK k contains integers of variable size and number of prime factors. It is indeed trivial to factor n given an oracle that factors n = αn if it happens that both n and n are proper elements of PK k . We observe that most factoringbased cryptosystems define instance generators which precisely tend to avoid this malleability property by construction (see Section 2). What we need for our purposes is to define non-malleability in a strong sense.
Definition. To properly capture non-malleability, we define two games in which a probabilistic algorithm R attempts to factor n ← Gen(1 k ) given access to an oracle A(n, aux) solving with probability one some computational problem reducible to FACT [Gen]. Here, A models the computational resources R has access to and aux stands for any auxiliary input given to the oracle A depending on how A is specified. We may write A(n, ·) instead of A(n, aux) to notify that aux is chosen freely and arbitrarily by R when A is called. Since we impose that oracle A be perfect, we can abuse notations and identify A to the problem solved by A. A typical example of computational resources modelled by A is when A is polynomial (in which case R is given no extra power), but one may consider problems reducible to FACT [Gen] that do confer a computational advantage to R, such as distinguishing quadratic residues modulo n, extracting e-th roots for gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 and so forth. In any case, we require A to be perfectly reducible to FACT [Gen] in polynomial time, that is, for any n ∈ PK k and any admissible value for aux, A(n, aux) must be solvable with probability one in time t A = poly (k) given factors(n). In Game 0, the success probability of R is defined as
where the probability is taken over the random tapes of R and A, R runs in extra time at most τ and makes at most queries to A(n, ·). We further define Succ
where the maximum is taken over all probabilistic algorithms R playing Game 0. This can be interpreted as the success probability of the best reduction that makes use of A(n, aux) to factor n for the given reduction parameters (τ, ). In Game 1, the reduction R is given, in addition to A, access to an auxiliary oracle FACT(·) that factors integers n ∈ PK k \ {n} with probability one. Its success probability Succ
where the probability is taken over the random tapes of R and A, R runs in extra time at most τ , makes A calls to A(n, ·) and FACT calls of the type FACT(n ) with n ∈ PK k \ {n} such that A + FACT ≤ . Let us define Succ
Proof. Recall that A denotes a computational problem here. Assume R (τ, ε, )-solves FACT [Gen] ⇐ A i.e. factors n ← Gen(1 k ) in extra time τ with no more than calls to an oracle A R solving A with probability ε. Let ε R be the success probability of R. We construct an algorithm M which plays Game 1 with respect to a perfect oracle A M for A and succeeds with identical probability and similar running time. Algorithm M works as follows. Given a randomly selected modulus n ← Gen(1 k ), M runs R on input n. Now when R calls A R (n, aux), M calls A M (n, aux) and forwards the output to R. When R calls A R (n , aux) for n ∈ PK k \ {n}, M calls FACT(n ) to get factors(n ) and solves A(n , aux) in time t A . M then returns the result to R. R eventually stops and M returns the output of R. The simulation of A R is perfect for any ε ∈ (0, 1). M requires extra time at most τ + · t A and makes at most calls to oracles A M and FACT(·) altogether.
Extended Separation Results
Theorem 5. Let E be a single-key factoring-based encryption scheme and assume E.keygen is non-malleable.
Obviously A is perfectly reducible to FACT [E.keygen] since given any n ∈ PK k , aux = c ∈ C n and factors(n), A(n, aux) is solved by computing m = Dec(factors(n), c) in time t A = poly (k). Applying Lemma 1, we get for any τ, and ε ∈ (0, 1):
We now extend asymptotically the above to τ, = poly (k). Since E.keygen is non-malleable, the malleability term To exemplify Corollary 2, we provide this extended impossibility result for Rabin-SAEP.
Theorem 6 (Standard-model security of Rabin-SAEP, revisited). Assume Rabin-SAEP.keygen is non-malleable. Then Rabin-SAEP admits no instantiation in the standard model which is chosen-ciphertext secure under the factoring assumption i.e. for any instantiation of H,
Similar uninstantiability results hold for single-key factoring-based encryption schemes which chosen-ciphertext security is shown to be equivalent to factoring in the RO model. Again, these stronger separations are effective only when the underlying key generation is non-malleable. In other words, either these encryption schemes do separate the RO model from the standard model in a very strong sense, or their key generation must be malleable along the lines of Definition 1. Encryption Twinning. Naor and Yung [17] and Dolev, Dwork and Naor [10] suggested transformations which when applied to IND-CPA-secure encryptions such as Blum-Goldwasser [4] or Chor-Goldreich [8] may lead to IND-CCA-secure schemes under the factoring assumption. The transformed schemes use public keys containing two or more independently generated moduli with respect to the basic scheme. This paradigm makes it possible to generically construct a larger class of factoring-based cryptosystems which IND-CCA-security can possibly be proven equivalent to factoring, thereby escaping all incompatibility results described earlier.
Overcoming Uninstantiability
We comment that the cornerstone of Theorem 1 resides in that the decryption oracle provided in the UBK-CCA game can serve as a factoring algorithm when interfaced with the black-box reduction R. We now see how encryption twinning prohibits such a use of the decryption oracle. The public key in a Naor-Yung-transformed encryption scheme NY(E) is (n 1 , n 2 , r) where n 1 , n 2 ← E.keygen and r is a random string used to generate NIZK proofs during encryption. An encryption of m ∈ M n 1 ∩ M n 2 is (c 1 = Enc(n 1 , m, r 1 ), c 2 = Enc(n 2 , m, r 2 ), π) where π is a proof that c 1 and c 2 encrypt the same plaintext. Now assume (as typically the case with single-key factoring-based encryption) there exists an efficient way to generate a random-looking c 1 such that its decryption Dec(factors(n 1 ), c 1 ) leads to an immediate recovery of factors(n 1 ). In a typical reduction R from FACT [E.keygen] to breaking the OW-CPA security of NY(E), R takes as input a modulus n 1 ← E.keygen(1 k ) but generates by itself the second key pair (n 2 , factors(n 2 )) ← E.keygen(1 k ) and r to constitute a public key pk = (n 1 , n 2 , r). Since R fully controls the generation of n 2 and r, R can use the simulator of the underlying NIZK proof system to create a valid encryption c = (c 1 , c 2 , π) for a random c 1 . Calling the OW-CPA adversary will then provide Dec(factors(n 1 ), c 1 ), thus allowing R to factor n 1 . The meta-reduction M playing the UBK-CCA game against NY(E) however, is given some public key PK = (N 1 , N 2 , R) and a decryption oracle implicitly parameterized by PK. Since R takes as input a single modulus and generates by itself the rest of the public key to be given to its adversarial oracle, M cannot, even if R is run on input N 1 , use the decryption oracle to answer the request(s) ((N 1 , n 2 , r), (c 1 , c 2 , π)) made by R because Pr [n 2 = N 2 ∨ r = R] is overwhelming.
6 Are Key Generators Non-Malleable?
Our extended impossibility results apply to single-key encryption schemes based on non-malleable key generation. We conjecture that most instance generators are in turn non-malleable and expect to see further research works based on this property in the future. A possible improvement of this work would be to give a formal proof of non-malleability for commonly referred generators such as RSA-3 or Sophie-Germain using computational number theory. Another issue is the design of non-trivial examples of malleable key generators. 
